

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**SUBJECT:** (Optional)

FY 1984 Security Committee (SECOM) Budget Request

FROM:

Chief, TSD/OS

EXTENSION**NO.****DATE**

21 May 1982

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)**DATE****RECEIVED****FORWARDED****OFFICER'S INITIALS****COMMENTS** (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)1. C/PPG/OS
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21 MAY 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Policy and Plans Group

FROM:

Chief, Technical Security Division

SUBJECT: FY 1984 Security Committee (SECOM)
Budget Request

1. Obviously, the descriptions used to identify various projects to be funded in the Base Level Support and New Initiative Sections of the budget proposal are couched in very broad terms to permit flexibility in the actual allocation of funds in the pertinent fiscal year. We have no problem with the definitions as given and believe our major concerns (both Technical Security Division and the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee) are adequately addressed. Ranking of these broad categories is not considered feasible.

2. We have looked at this proposal in the context of the DDS&T R&D Budget for the same fiscal year. There are no significant overlaps as far as we are concerned. You should recall that the OS/TSD budget contains no funding for R&D. Furthermore, we hope PPG realizes that the purpose of SECOM input to the Intelligence Community Budget is to get supplementary funds for projects being carried on in individual agencies and that there may well be duplication of projects in the DDS&T R&D Budget. In this context, duplication is not necessarily bad.


3. SECOM seems to be taking a very narrow approach to the request for money in the Base Line Level; their proposals for out-years 1985-1988 show a very small increase in possible request, This amount does not even cover the inflation factor, nor does it take into consideration the increased amount of R&DE that will need to be undertaken on large projects which are of broad Community interest. In the New Initiatives area, there should really be no new initiatives beyond FY 1984. It is conceivable that you can cover new initiatives in FY 1984, due to the shortfalls in 1982/1983, but beyond that it is impossible to identify new initiatives with any degree of accuracy and especially to request funds for same.

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4. We feel it is essential for the Director of Security to emphasize the necessity for the submission of the so-called New Initiatives and not just the R&D package (Base Level of Support). The section on New Initiatives dealing with Technical Security Countermeasures is a synthesis of requirements submitted by TSCS and we feel it should be strongly supported.

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18 May 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security (PTAS)

FROM:

Chief, Policy and Plans Group

SUBJECT: FY 1984 Security Committee (SECOM) Budget Request

1. Attached for your perusal and for the comments of Chief, Technical Security Division, and Chief, Information Systems Security Group, are documents relating to the FY 1984 SECOM budget request. This request addresses the Base Level Support required to sustain effort and the SECOM R&D efforts in FY 1984. In addition, the Chairman, SECOM, has submitted a New Initiative request for 1984.

2. As you will note in paragraph 2 of the covering memorandum, each member of the Security Committee is requested to be prepared to rank these budget items at a meeting scheduled for 26 May. It would be helpful to if representatives of your directorate would provide any comments, either for or against these projects. It is conceded it may be difficult to provide indepth ranking preferences because of the lack of specific details in the justifications, however, any input would be appreciated. We should be particularly careful to eliminate any duplications between the R&D projects proposed by the Security Committee and any efforts anticipated for 1983/84 as part of either our budget or the DDS&T R&D package.

3. Your comments, either verbal or written, would be appreciated by COB Friday, 21 May.

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-182

12 May 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, DCI Security Committee
Chairmen, SECOM Subcommittees and Working Groups

25X1 FROM: [REDACTED]
Chairman

25X1 SUBJECT: FY 1984 SECOM Budget Request [REDACTED]

25X1 1. Attached for your review is a copy of the tentative FY 1984 SECOM budget submission I provided the Intelligence Community Staff in order to meet an internal deadline. Items in that submission are to carry forward national level programs [REDACTED] and baseline R&D to support broad security requirements of the Community; and to address new initiatives identified to us by SECOM subcommittees and working groups as items of Community concern. In all cases, budget submissions address common, Community-wide security problems which are beyond the capability or responsibility of any single agency. Budgeted funds will be used to supplement individual agency efforts in a manner that will benefit several or all Community components. [REDACTED]

25X1 2. I ask your particular attention to the new initiatives included in this budget submission. Highlights on them are given in Tab D to the attachment. Since overall budget constraints on the Intelligence Community Staff may limit the total amount SECOM can request in FY 1984, we need to be prepared to identify those new initiatives of greatest importance to the Community and defend them through the budget review process. We had previously scheduled a SECOM meeting for 26 May to discuss SECOM budget proposals. I request you to come to that meeting prepared to rank these FY 1984 budget items, particularly the new initiatives, as being of great, some or no interest to your departments and agencies. Chairmen of SECOM subcommittees and working groups are requested to come to the 26 May meeting prepared to provide amplifying detail on these items. [REDACTED]

25X1 Attachment

25X1 Regraded CONFIDENTIAL When
Separated from Attachment

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-180

11 May 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Community Coordination

25X1 FROM: [REDACTED]

Chairman

SUBJECT: FY 1984 Budget

REFERENCES: A. SECOM-D-159, dated 26 April 1982
B. SECOM-D-161, dated 28 April 1982

1. This is a refinement of budget submissions made in references. We have coordinated items involved in the transfer of our budget program from CIA/OS to the ICS and have endeavored to place our budget request in the proper format. [REDACTED]

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3. SECOM's base level of support represents the amount established to address common, Community-wide security R&D problems which have not or cannot be addressed by any one agency. Key areas of broad Community concern which are addressed in this base level include security R&D, technical surveillance countermeasures, and computer security. [REDACTED]

25X1 25X1 [REDACTED]

5. New initiatives suggested for the 1984 budget encompass the entire range of Community security concerns. They also address problems where individual efforts are insufficient or where the problem is by nature a shared Community concern. Highlights are attached at Tab D. The brief descriptions of our budget requests can be amplified by more detailed proposals which we have obtained from each of the Subcommittees of the SECOM. [REDACTED]

25X1 Attachments [REDACTED]

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New Initiatives

Our new initiatives address Community security problems and concerns of a broad character that transcend the normal responsibility of a single agency. The projects represented here do not provide for all identified needs.

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Staff Increase

FY 84

- 2 Professionals GS-15
- 2 Clerical GS-7 (OUO)

The requested increases involve:

- One professional senior staff officer to be responsible for information and document security matters. This would enable the SECOM Executive Secretary to devote necessary time to SECOM administration and overall coordination of effort, as well as serving as a backup capability in any of the three major disciplines of information, personnel and physical security.

- One professional senior staff officer to be responsible for coordinating and facilitating interagency investigations of unauthorized disclosures. This individual would necessarily be senior enough to develop and carry out liaison activities with security elements at the White House and with the Hill committees who are privy to classified intelligence information. The coordinator would also establish and maintain a data base on unauthorized disclosures and conduct studies of long-term damage caused by leaks.

- The skills necessary to perform the coordinator function include broad experience in the security disciplines, knowledge of the Intelligence Community, experience in the political branches and experience in systems analysis.

- One GS-5/7 secretary/stenographer for support of the SECOM staff.

- One GS-7 administrative assistant for the GS-15 unauthorized disclosures coordinator. This position would also need a word processor with memory capability for storage of data base.

Justification:

DCI security responsibilities for the Community have increased, and appear to be continuing to do so. Examples:

- E.O. 12333, U.S. Intelligence Activities, put more emphasis on DCI security responsibilities than did the predecessor orders.

- NSDD-19 implementation involves a broad invitation to the DCI to propose additional measures for the better protection of intelligence.

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[REDACTED]

- The 31 March 1982 report on unauthorized disclosures the Attorney General sent the President cites SECOM as the only body which crosses department and agency lines with a coordinating role to develop and review security policies and programs.

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- NSSD-2 implementation efforts focus largely on protective security measures, which are the charter responsibility of SECOM.

[REDACTED]

Internally, changing working relationships and evolving perceptions of needs are also increasing SECOM's workload. Examples:

- Charter revision affecting SECOM, COMIREX and the SIGINT Committee are resulting in the latter two bodies disclaiming in favor of SECOM any responsibility for protective security measures to safeguard information those committees determine needs compartmented or classified status.

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- Communications (COMSEC) and emanations (TEMPEST) security authorities are, for the first time, seeking explicit SECOM assistance and advice in improving personnel and physical security measures bearing on their areas of responsibility. [REDACTED]

Security Awareness

This Community program coordinates and shares the best of departmental security education programs. Previously chaired and funded by NSA, this program has grown beyond that Agency's capability and resources; the demand for this program continues to increase in all areas involving security. In 1983, funding was provided in the CIA/OS program to develop professional materials (films, slides, scripts, etc.) for use by all agencies and departments. The Multidisciplinary Threat Assessment and NSSD 2/82 emphasized the need for a broad and coherent educational program (including commercial quality presentations) in an effort to counter hostile intelligence threats. [REDACTED]

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Personnel Security

Initiatives are under way for thorough examination of Community personnel security programs. Weaknesses have been discovered and corrective action taken by individual departments. Personnel security problems were addressed in a 1979 study conducted by the House Permanent Select Committee (Intelligence) with recommendations, for example, that personnel security practices be standardized in the Intelligence Community, and that the DCI undertake to examine the value of polygraph techniques in personnel screening. This has resulted in growing

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interest for broader use of the polygraph and new searches for better personnel security procedures. These include nonverbal deception and detection techniques (examining predictive behavior in the context of security disciplines).

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